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ISSN 1109-6691 Editorial 
  The South-Eastern European Monetary History Network (SEEMHN) is a 
community of financial historians, economists and statisticians, established in April 
2006 at the initiation of the Bulgarian National Bank and the Bank of Greece. Its 
objective is to spread knowledge on the economic history of the region in the context 
of European experience with a specific focus on financial, monetary and banking 
history. The First and the Second Annual Conferences were held in Sofia (BNB) in 
2006 and in Vienna (OeNB) in 2007. Additionally, the SEEMHN Data Collection 
Task Force aims at establishing a historical data base with 19
th and 20
th century 
financial and monetary data for countries in the region. A set of data has already been 
published as an annex to the 2007 conference proceedings, released by the OeNB 
(2008, Workshops, no 13). 
On 13-14 March 2008, the Third Annual Conference was held in Athens, 
hosted by the Bank of Greece. The conference was dedicated to Banking and Finance 
in South-Eastern Europe: Lessons of Historical Experience. It was attended by 
representatives of the Albanian, Austrian, Belgian, Bulgarian, German, Greek, 
Romanian, Russian, Serbian and Turkish central banks, as well as participants from a 
number of universities and research institutions. Professor Michael Bordo delivered 
the key note speech on Growing up to Financial Stability. The participants presented, 
reviewed and assessed the experience of SE Europe with financial development, 
banking and central banking from a comparative and historical perspective. 
The 4
th Annual SEEMHN Conference will be hosted by the National Serbian 
Bank on 27
th March 2009 in Belgrade. The topic of the Conference will be Economic 
and Financial Stability in SE Europe in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. 
  The papers presented at the 2008 SEEMHN Conference are being made 
available to a wider audience in the Working Paper Series of the Bank of Greece. 
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In the framework of the broader political and economic development of the individual 
states on Balkan Peninsula the author has made the comparison between the 
performance of the banking sector in Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece and Bulgaria. The 
analysis was carried out on the sample of balance sheets for the most important joint 
stock banking companies in the respective countries in the years 1928 and 1929 which 
represent the peak of the activity and performance of banks in region. In the following 
years the whole region sank in the abyss of the Great Depression of the thirties when 
the issue of banking performance was considered on the different way. One of the 
common features of the banks in region is certainly the prevailing role of short-term 
resources and a huge imbalance in interest incomes and incomes from other bank 
transactions. This fact does not only testify to high margins and effective interest rates, 
but also to a limited portfolio in bank services and other transactions, which was the 
consequence of the social and economic environment that banks had to operate in.   
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1. Introduction 
The subject defined in the title belongs to the area of a wider, long-term 
project entitled “The Banking Performance in Slovenia up to WWII in a European 
Context”. The fundamental purpose of this project is to show the business results of 
Slovene banking joint-stock companies in a European context. This way, we were 
planning to establish not only business results, but also the environment and 
conditions which lead to these results. The project has been carried out over two years 
and is now practically at its initial stage.  
From a wider programme perspective, I would like to shed light on problems 
regarding the success of banking performance in individual states of South-eastern 
Europe and their interactive value relations. Through a comparative approach and in 
the cases of large or the most important banking joint-stock companies from the 
newly-established Yugoslavia, the substantially extended Romania as well as Greece 
and Bulgaria, I would like to present the preliminary results of the research on 
banking performance on the basis of financial statements. Unfortunately, the analysis 
did not include Albania, which was originally to be covered in the research, due to 
insufficient information. Before performing the analysis, it is necessary to present at 
least the basic distinctions of South-eastern Europe in the 1920s, since our analysis 
will be performed on the referential years of 1928 and 1929. This means we also have 
to ask the question about the general economic situation and especially the question 
about elementary development features in the banking of the countries in South-
eastern Europe.   
 
2. General economic condition of the region in the twenties 
The interwar period, which was the time of profound and turbulent changes for 
the states of South-eastern Europe, falls in two sections, which are different in their 
characteristics - the 1920s and 1930s.  Herewith we shall focus on the 1920s, since 
this period is, after all, the period for which we are performing the analysis of banking 
performance. 
 At the end of WW I, the situation in the economy and politics in the Balkan 
Peninsula, and consequently also in social respect, was dramatic. The states had to   8
deal with material destruction, the organisation of economic processes inside the new 
ethnic-economic areas
1, financial disorder, chronic budget deficits, inflation, problems 
with balances of payments with foreign countries, high rate of unemployment, high 
natural growth, agrarian reforms, political instability and inefficient state 
administrations, unbalanced economic structure, and great deficiency in consumer 
goods.   
Problems were many, while on the other hand the possibilities and assets for 
overcoming the obstacles were extremely scarce. Moreover, during the 1920's, none 
of these countries experienced political stability, which was the prerequisite for 
economic and social development. After the war, they were more or less damaged in 
economic and social terms. With the exception of Bulgaria, which was troubled by 
reparations, Yugoslavia, Romania and Greece had to deal with the integration of their 
new territories in the common political and economic environment, which, when it 
came to Romania and Yugoslavia, introduced great tensions in the internal political 
situation due to their multi-ethnic structures.   
In economic terms, these countries were at the verge of European economic 
modernisation processes, showing their agrarian character through the unbalanced 
property structure and agrarian over-population.  It was obvious that small farms, 
which still had not entirely abandoned the autarkic principle of operation, were in the 
majority. Agrarian reforms, primarily as a political act, offered absolutely no 
contributions to market-oriented agriculture. Many times, the reforms were aimed 
against property owners of foreign nationalities, at least that was the case in 
Yugoslavia (against property owners of Hungarian and German nationality) and also 
in Romania, because of Transylvania. In Bulgaria and Greece, this issue was 
substantially less topical.  
In the case of international exchange in the countries of South-eastern Europe, 
agricultural crops, which did not provide sufficient inflow of foreign assets for the 
stimulation of domestic non-agrarian sector, were prevalent. Dependence on foreign 
accumulation – foreign capital – was extensive, both in the area of industrial 
investments as well as the banking sector. Non-attachment to foreign capital centres 
of Vienna, Berlin, Paris, London or Rome was inevitable. The domestic financial 
                                                 
1 Territorial expansion of Greece into Thrace and territorial expansion of Romania into Transylvania, as 
well as economic and political integration of multi-ethnical Yugoslav regions.   9
sector was a shallow, underdeveloped basin, while the role of foreign banks in 
national economies of the Balkans was more than substantial.  The consequence of 
imbalance between the offer in capital and demand was non-proportionally high 
interest rates on national financial markets, which caused an excess in the financial 
flow from debtors to creditors, thus slowing down the already slow economic 
development even more.  
To put it simply, we can say the countries of South-eastern Europe found 
themselves caught in some sort of a vicious circle. These countries by themselves did 
not have sufficient capital and, at the same time, it was hard for them to acquire 
foreign means of payment, since their export sector was normally a non-competitive 
one. In the first half of the 1920s, the agriculture failed to recover and did not provide 
a stable support.  This way, there were no sufficient assets to finance the import of 
know-how and technology. The only remaining choice was the accumulation of debts 
or attracting foreign investment – however, these countries were limited even in this 
area. Their creditworthiness and interest in them showed by foreign investors were 
low. The readiness of investors to ignore the politically and socially unstable situation 
was, as always, also low. 
      After WWI, the East European countries thus shared the same need for 
industrialisation to avoid the imminent social problems. The pressure of 
overpopulated countryside was extensive, the door to immigration closed.  All of 
these countries made efforts to develop agriculture in the direction of increased 
marketability and commercialisation in order to achieve, through export, the all too 
necessary financial assets needed for the import of consumer goods, and to acquire 
equipment for the planned industrialisation. This was almost a Sisyphean task, since 
agriculture, due to its weak points (structure, technology, tradition etc), was barely 
able to perform it. In most of these countries, the anti-capitalist ideology, which was 
the consequence of insufficient economic and social competitiveness in this region, 
embedded in the European environment, was socially relevant or, in other words, 
influential. For this reason it is only a small wonder that the principle of cooperatives, 
a wide economic-ideological mechanism, was on the increase in order to finally 
enable farmers and other participants in the small business sector to be able to follow 
the path of modernisation in economic and social foundations.  
   10
The improvement came only in the second half of the 1920s, after the 
economic and partly also political stabilisation was completed by the mid 1920s, and 
with a simultaneous economic growth in Western Europe. Then, a period of relative 
stability was followed in the second half of the 1920s. The agricultural sector was 
finally at least partly stabilised and the countries of South-eastern  Europe even 
recorded improvement in the industrial area, which was the consequence of the 
following economic-nationalistic policies: hindering access to one’s own 
market/protective customs policies, encouragement of domestic investments (also 
foreign investments in cooperation with domestic investors) as well as tax and 
financial benefits. Most of those countries experienced one of their first 
industrialisation waves and, in most cases, the leading sector in this process was the 
textile industry. The increase in economic growth was only one of the indicators. For 
a more balanced image, it is also necessary to include the growth of gross domestic 
product per capita. Here, the success was substantially smaller. This was partly due to 
a low starting point, which enabled high economic growth, and largely due to a great 
natural increase. The case of Romania even shows that, despite the rapid development 
in the late 1920s, the GDP per capita remained practically unchanged for the entire 
period of the 1920s.  
To sum up, we can say that Eastern Europe was, prior to the great economic 
crisis, an underdeveloped and economically vulnerable region, despite its evident 
progress. The standard of living and agricultural and industrial efficiency were low. 
Although the strategy of economic nationalism was successful, enterprises were 
hardly competitive due to their substantially expensive manufacturing processes. The 
entire area was extremely sensitive to external impulses, since it largely depended on 
exporting to the west, mostly in agricultural crops, under relatively affordable prices. 
And in the opposite direction, the area depended on the import of capital. As long as 




                                                 
2 Derek Aldcroft, The European Economy 1914-2000, Routledge, 2001, pp. ; John Lampe- Marvin 
Jackson, Balkan Economic History, 1550 – 1950, Indiana University Press, 1982, pp. 376-433.; Ivan 
Berend, Decade of Crisis, University of California Press, 1998, pp. 224-246; Alice Teichova, 
Kleinstatten in der Spanungsfeld der Grossmaechten, Wien, 1988.   11
3.  The features of the private banking sector 
Before moving on to the interpretation of comparative information from the 
balance sheets, we definitely have to take a quick yet closer look at the situation in the 
private banking system of the 1920s in the analysed states. From the first post-war 
years to the mid 1920s, all of the above-mentioned countries shared the same 
monetary instability with high or low inflation rates. In all these countries, the 
banking sector can be systematically divided into three groups showing both basic as 
well as historical-developmental characteristics of banking. Two fundamental motive 
powers for economic development in the interwar period were the state on one hand, 
and foreign capital on the other, which is already mentioned above. The state acted as 
a substitute for the insufficiently developed entrepreneurial environment and the 
insufficient accumulation of capital. For this reason, the role of the state in banking 
was, through national and quasi-national banking institutions, indispensable. Most of 
the time, the state provided long-term financing for agriculture as the most important 
sector, and encouraged industrialisation, while special mortgage banks with long-term 
loans were common.  
As mentioned before, the countries of South-eastern Europe strongly depended 
on the inflow of foreign capital. However, this capital did not only flow to those 
countries through governmental arrangements, meaning the indirect loans or 
emissions of different issues and forms of government bonds, but also through a 
network of foreign private banks in South-eastern Europe. In all those states, foreign 
banks from West-European monetary capital held significant shares and made large 
investments in local economies, while industry was also an important factor. Their 
role became evident as their presence in the time of the great economic crisis – at the 
time when foreign banks were retreating to their parent establishments.  
Foreign owned banks had the advantage over local banks, since they had the 
support of their parent banks, thus having access to more favourable sources of 
financing. In all respects, they definitely had an advantage over domestic private 
banks, which were, in accumulating their assets, normally relying on local inhabitants 
and entrepreneurs. Central banks, which fall into a completely different category, 
have been left out of this classification, despite the interwar period, when central 
banking in the East European countries was institutionally completely independent.   12
The central bank of Greece can be given as the most referential case (Trapeza tis 
Ellados, 1928).
3  
For banking, the 1920s were the years of progress and prosperity in terms of 
business. During the early post-war years, the rapid growth in the number of banks 
and the scope of business was typical of all referenced states. In Romania, the number 
increased by four, while the share capital and balance sheet totals increased ten or 
even twenty times by 1923 alone.
4 In Bulgaria, there were allegedly 31 times more 
banks prior to WWII than there had been prior to WWI.
5 Growth was also high in 
Greece
6 and Yugoslavia. It was not only the number of bank companies that were on 
the increase. Even more, it was the network of their subsidiaries that were on the rise, 
which included the widest classes of society in the mechanism of financial 
intermediation. Although banks had increased the intake of assets from the inhabitants, 
judging by the case in Greece, the structure was inadequate, since it was the case of 
small, short-term deposits.
7  
Besides, the networks of loan-granting cooperatives were also competition to 
domestic banking joint-stock companies when it came to the intake of savings, 
although they did not represent a serious threat to banking joint-stock companies. 
Slovenia was an exception, since loan-granting cooperatives collected most of the 
financial assets from the inhabitants out of all the monetary institutions.
8 The banking 
market was therefore competitive and functionally inter-complementary. The situation 
in Greece, where the bank Ethniki Trapeza tis Ellados had had a distinctive advantage, 
was the most extraordinary of all the countries in South-Eastern Europe. During the 
entire interwar period, this bank held an absolute monopoly, even in the loan market.
9 
The major part of quantitative growth in banking was recorded in the first period.  
Later on came the period of the consolidation of banking sector. Namely, a number of 
                                                 
3 Margarita Dritsas, The structure of the Greek commercial banking system 1840 - 1980. Handbook of 
the European Banks, 1994, pp. 491-532. 
4 Arnaldo Mauri - Claudia Gabriela Baicu, Storia della banca in Romania, Parte Prima. 
Working Paper n.18.2002 – luglio, Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Aziendale 
Università degli Studi di Milano. 
5 Ljuben Berov, Budgetary Policy, Money Supply and Banking in Bulgaria between the Wars. Charles 
H. Feinstein (ed.), Banking, Currency and Finance in Europe between the Wars, 1995, pp. 374-394. 
6  George B. Dertilis and Constantine Costis, Banking, Public Finance, and the Economy: Greece, 
1919–1933. Charles H. Feinstein (ed.), Banking, Currency and Finance in Europe between the Wars, 
1995, pp. 458-471. 
7 Žarko Lazarević – Jože Prinčič, Zgodovina slovenskega bančništva (History of Slovenian banks), 
2000. 
8 Dritsas, op. cit. 
9 Lazarević –Prinčič, op. cit.   13
banks were not able to carry out the transition from monetary into the economic 
stability of the 2nd half of the 1920s.  Malnourished in terms of capital and poorly 
managed, the banks were either liquidated through termination or taken over by more 
solid competitors.   
In the 1920s, the prevailing banking model in the states of South-eastern 
Europe was copied from the model of German universal banks. In practice, this meant 
that banks were, through their business, uniting both the commercial-deposit and 
investment functions. In their investment function, domestic-owned banks were 
limited by the prevalence of short-term deposits, since these banks found it more 
difficult to change such deposits to long-term capital or industrial investments. Even 
in this area, foreign owned banks were at an advantage due to a more favourable 
structure of assets. The consequence of this type of business model was the so-called 
banking groups or banking consortiums, which included affiliated enterprises – 
banking joint-stock companies from different sectors.   
 
4. The way of comparison  
According to the systematic presentation of the environment and situation in 
South-eastern Europe banking in the 1920s, we can move on to the interpretation of 
the comparative analysis of success in banking performance. The direct comparison 
will be carried out for the periods of 1928 and 1929, since an adequate database 
supported by relevant supplements in reference to Greece is at this moment available 
only for these two periods. This type of database also provides roughly identical 
terminology and value bases for a comprehensive comparative valorisation and 
assessment on the level of individual institutions in financial intermediation.   
The period selection of 1928 and 1929 was not accidental for another, equally 
important reason. This is the year when banking performance was still carried out 
under "normal" conditions, while at the same time it is the period when the economic 
activity reached its peak in all the states of South-eastern Europe. After this, the entire 
region succumbed to the great economic crisis, when the success in banking 
performance was shown in an entirely different light. Criteria of this success also 
changed. Namely, the existence of the private banking sector was under threat and the 
intervention of the state became an inevitable necessity.   14
The source of data for analysis was taken from the Compass magazine, which 
used to be published in Vienna, where the featured balance sheets of joint-stock 
companies for individual countries were, at least to some extent, organised by a 
common principle, which enables relevant comparison. The best quality data was 
published for Yugoslavia and Romania, where they could be seen in regular annual 
intervals over a longer period of time.
10 However, much greater difficulties emerge 
when it comes to other countries. Data about the situation in Bulgaria was taken from 
the Year 1930, where balance items of joint-stock companies from Yugoslavia, 
Bulgaria and Albania are presented in one place.
11 The part about Yugoslavia was 
sufficient, but there was practically no information regarding Albania. With the 
exception of the national bank, the information about Albania showed no published 
balance sheets of banking joint-stock companies. In the case of Bulgaria, only one, 
much narrowed selection of banking institutions was published, yet in such numbers 
that the relevancy of the referenced pattern was not questionable after all. It was 
possible to include Greece
12  only after the acquisition of balance sheets for most 
significant banks.
13  
After having studied the material that was collected, it was necessary to decide 
on individual elements for the comparison. The original idea was to bring the balance 
sheet data to a comparable level by converting it into relative ratios, which is enabled 
by the return-on-equity indices (ROE)
14, net interest on the average balance sheet 
total
15, margins in financial brokerage
16, return on the bank’s assets (ROA),
17 
effective loan interest rates
18, and effective loan interest rates for foreign assets
19 and 
assets on the average balance sheet total
20.   
 
                                                 
10 Compass, Finanzielles Jahrbuch 1930, Band Jugoslavien, Bulgarien, Albanien, Wien, 1930; Band 
Rumänien 1931, Wien, 1930. 
11 Compass, Finanzielles Jahrbuch 1930, Band Jugoslavien, Bulgarien, Albanien, Wien, 1930. 
12 Annuaire Statistique de la Grece 1930. 
13 Balance sheets for the Greek banks were kindly and generously submitted to me by colleagues 
Sophia Lazaretou and Martin Ivanov, for which I would like to express my gratitude.  
14 The revised net profit in one year/average amount of initial capital, reserves and net profit taken over 
from previous periods.  
15 The difference between interest incomes and interest payable/average balance sheet total 
16 Net interest and return on banking operation/average balance sheet total 
17 Net interest, return on banking operation, return on real-estate/average balance sheet total 
18 Interest incomes/average amount in return on investments 
19 Interest payable/average amount in foreign assets 
20 Administrative costs and salaries/average balance sheet total   15
The first attempts already showed that, due to differences in national 
accounting standards and the requirements classified by structure, a comparison in all 
categories would not be possible. The following categories were taken as the most 
undisputable - return on the bank's assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and costs.  
In addition to that, we have added a comparison in the amounts of remitted dividends. 
In itemising the balance sheets, we were interested in the structure of a bank’s 
financial assets or, in other words, the relation between domestic and foreign assets as 
well as the structure of assets and liabilities in the balance sheet total.     
The analysis was carried out on a certain pattern in banks for each state 
separately. The selection criteria were based on the amount of share capital and 
balance sheet totals, which was to provide relevance in the pattern. Moreover, we can 
also mention the fact that the structure of information enabled us to classify 
Yugoslavia in terms of regions. This way we will carry out a comparison on the level 





24 or subsequent Yugoslav republics, which are today independent states 
(Slovenia
25, Croatia





30 ). The analysis of assets and liabilities in balance sheets will be 
performed with a regional classification for Yugoslavia. 
The comparison will therefore be carried out on a limited segment of possible 
analytical assumptions. It will be done in line with the currently available database, 
which will continue to be supplemented in future, thus gaining relevance of future 
findings, and all its characteristics. At the moment, the analysis presented hereafter is 
certainly of a limited range. However, this analysis cannot be any different, since it 
only presents a fraction of the long-term research or preliminary results, on the basis 
of the current database. Nevertheless, it is certainly possible to establish some facts at 
this early stage. In the framework of defined limitations, these facts do not reflect all 
                                                 
21 Balkanska banka (Balkanische bank), Banque Bulgare de Commerce (Bulgarische Handels bank), 
Banque Franco-Belge de Bulgarie, Banca Commerciale Italiana e Bulgara 
22 Banca Marmorosch, Blank & Co., Banca de Credit Roman, Banca de Scont a Romaniei, Banca 
Romaneasca 
23 Trapeza Athinion, Emboriki Trapeza, Ethniki Trapeza tis Ellados 
24 Jugoslovenska banka, Opšte jugoslovensko bankarsko društvo 
25 Ljubljanska kreditna banka 
26 Prva hrvatska štedionica, Hrvatska sveobča kreditna banka 
27 Srbska centralna privredna banka 
28 Beogradska trgovačka banka, Prometna banka 
29 Crnogorska banka 
30 Banka Stara Srbija   16
details, but they do present structural features and trends in the banking performance 
of South-eastern Europe at the end of the 1920s. 
 
5. Banking performance  
After presenting the basic questions regarding the contents and methodology, 
we can approach the interpretation of the acquired data. Let us approach the subject 
where the features of banking performance, and also the characteristics of the 
environment in which the banks were doing business, start to come out through the 
balance sheets. When we look at the issue of the return on equity (ROE), we can see 
that, in this category, Romanian banks, which had, for example, twice the return on 
equity ratio, if compared with Greek banks, strongly stand out. The Romanian banks 
were followed by Bulgarian banks whose profitability was lower by one third. On 
average, Yugoslav banks had a slight advantage over Greek banks, but many 
differences still existed amongst individual Yugoslav regions. When evaluating 
profitability, Slovene and Croatian banks were at the top. They substantially surpassed 
banks from other parts of Yugoslavia, which were below the Yugoslav average.  
 
Figure 1: Return on equity 
 
Source: Compass, Finanzielles Jahrbuch 1930, Band Jugoslavien, Bulgarien, Albanien, Wien, 
1930; Band Rumänien 1931, Wien, 1930; Annuaire Statistique de la Grece 1930.   17
 
Evaluating the efficiency of banking performance through the element of the 
return on a bank's assets (ROA) does not change the established ratios – only the 
differences are no longer as obvious as they were in the case detailed in the previous 
section. It is no doubt that Romanian bankers were the most successful in introducing 
and performing bank services. In this respect, they were closely followed by their 
Bulgarian colleagues with a one third setback. All these facts undoubtedly testify to  
relatively high margins in financial brokerage and subsequently also effective interest 
rates in Romania and Bulgaria. If the Greek bankers in the previous category of return 
on equity still showed setback, in this case they were completely equal with the 
Yugoslav level. Within Yugoslavia, banks from Montenegro persuasively conquer the 
leading position, being followed by Croatian and Slovene banks.  
 
   Figure 2: Return on the bank’s assets  
 
 
Source: Compass, Finanzielles Jahrbuch 1930, Band Jugoslavien, Bulgarien, Albanien, Wien, 1930;  
Band Rumänien 1931, Wien, 1930; Annuaire Statistique de la Grece 1930. 
 
   18
The possibility of paying dividends also depended on profitability. Thus we 
will only present the numerical rate of dividends and their ratios
31. However, we won't 
be able to interpret them in terms of contents, since we are not familiar with the 
principles of business strategy in the referenced banks and decisions brought at each 
of the general shareholder's meetings. Similarly, we cannot claim that high 
profitability generates high dividends. This assumption is always being questioned. 
Namely, this assumption is made relative by the conduct of a substantial number of 
banks, where it is impossible to find the correlation between the amount in dividends 
and the rate of profitability. Romanian banks stand out in this case as well, having a 
distinct advantage over other banks, in which the level in Slovene banks is 
surprisingly low.  
 
Figure 3: The amount of paid dividends 
 
Source: Compass, Finanzielles Jahrbuch 1930, Band Jugoslavien, Bulgarien, Albanien, Wien, 1930; 
Band Rumänien 1931, Wien, 1930; Annuaire Statistique de la Grece 1930. 
 
 
                                                 
31 Unfortunately, this assumption cannot be given for Greek banks, since we have, for the time being, 
not been presented with referential data.   19
The established ratios can also be proved by the indicators of cost 
effectiveness – but in reversed order. It may be true that profitability in Romanian and 
Bulgarian banks was above average, but this profitability was reached through lower 
cost efficiency, comparing to the banks of other states in South-eastern Europe. It is 
certainly not too early to make an assumption that this was the consequence of higher 
margins in financial intermediation and consequently higher effective loan interest 
rates. 
 
 Figure 4: Cost efficiency 
 
Source: Compass, Finanzielles Jahrbuch 1930, Band Jugoslavien, Bulgarien, Albanien, Wien, 1930; 
Band Rumänien 1931, Wien, 1930; Annuaire Statistique de la Grece 1930. 
 
 
The presented relation in the return on equity and bank assets as well as the 
amount of dividends was certainly also affected by the ratio between internal and 
foreign assets in the analysed banks. Here, the situation changes drastically. As it 
turns out, Slovene banks had by far the widest ratio – per one unit of their own assets 
they acquired more than eleven foreign units. Slovene banks were followed by 
Croatian banks with a two thirds setback. In Yugoslavia, banks from the eastern 
Yugoslav regions had relatively high shares in their own assets. The ratio in those 
parts of the state was between 1:3 or 1:4. In Romania, Bulgaria and Greece, the   20
situation was almost equal, with the ratio being around 16 times higher than the value 
of foreign assets per one unit of a bank's own assets. The high share in foreign assets 
in Croatia and, especially, in Slovenia was certainly the consequence of a thick 
network in all sorts of banking institutions, which covered the widest classes of 
citizens through their financial intermediation network.  
 
 Figure 5: The ratio between foreign assets and assets possessed by the banks  
 
Source: Compass, Finanzielles Jahrbuch 1930, Band Jugoslavien, Bulgarien, Albanien, Wien, 1930; 
Band Rumänien 1931, Wien, 1930; Annuaire Statistique de la Grece 1930. 
 
 
The profitability and costs in Greek banks, which were below and over 
average, certainly gets a clearer image by including both assets and liabilities from 
balance sheets in the analysis. Surprisingly, the balance sheets of Greek banks show a 
non-proportionally high relative shares in reserves. This is especially true when Greek 
banks are compared with banks from the remaining states. The average relative value 
of reserves in the balance sheets of Greek banks amounted to nearly 14%, which 
exceeded the Romanian and Bulgarian average 17 times. The mean value in   21
Yugoslavia was double the Bulgarian or Romanian mean value. This is mostly the 
result of a relatively high level of reserves in the banks of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
By far the lowest level in reserves, which can also be proved by a great difference in 
the ratio between banks' own and foreign assets, was held by Slovene banks.  
 
  Figure 6: The share of reserves in the balance sheet total 
 
Source: Compass, Finanzielles Jahrbuch 1930, Band Jugoslavien, Bulgarien, Albanien, Wien, 1930; 
Band Rumänien 1931, Wien, 1930; Annuaire Statistique de la Grece 1930. 
 
 
An insight in the structural character of balance sheets reveals interesting 
details. Bulgarian banks collected most of the assets from local population, while the 
corporative sector and other forms of asset acquisition, such as rediscount, and 
represented a substantially lower contribution to assets. The situation in Greece was 
similar. However, this cannot be said about Romanian banks. The intake of financial 
assets from the local population was relatively less important, since more assets were 
taken in at the corporative sector and through rediscount. Regarding these types of 
features, Yugoslavia united both the emphasised characteristics, but they were 
conditioned in terms of regional position. Banks in the western part of the state, those   22
in Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, were evenly acquiring assets both 
from the local population and through rediscount. In the south-eastern part of the state, 
the share of the local population in resources was high, yet the rediscount share was 
low, since the banks took in more short-term deposits on the correspondent accounts. 
The structure of financial resources shows a fact unfavourable for the entire region, 
namely that banks had mostly short-term resources to operate with.  
The asset parts of the balance sheets also show an interesting situation, since 
they reveal substantial differences in the structure of the asset balance items. This way, 
banks for the eastern part of Yugoslavia are on a strong lead when it comes to 
operating through bills of exchange, as operation through bills of exchange in those 
parts of the state represented over as much as 40 % of investments. These were 
closely followed by Bulgarian banks, which had a one third share in the bills of 
exchange in balance sheet totals. A high share in the operation through bills of 
exchange, on the other hand, meant the share in direct crediting, if individuals or 
commercial establishment was lower, which consequently reduced the share of 
indirect shares in the capital of other enterprises. In this respect, Romania and Greece 
were closer to the western parts of Yugoslavia, where Slovenia, with a low share in 
bills-of-exchange operation, had a strong lead. The latter countries thus enjoyed a 
more balanced structure in investments, with direct crediting of commercial 
establishments through current account (correspondent accounts) being in the first 
place. In the case of banks from western Yugoslavia, one can also notice a relatively 
higher value in the share of direct ownership of other enterprises.  
At the end, we can say that the analysed banks had primarily one thing in 
common and that is the fact that they both shared the same geographical area in the 
region of South-eastern Europe. However, a common pattern is nowhere to be found, 
although common patterns do exist in some segments of a certain shared feature. One 
of those features is certainly the prevailing role of short-term resources and a huge 
imbalance in interest incomes and incomes from other bank transactions. This fact 
does not only testify to high margins and effective interest rates, but also to a limited 
portfolio in bank services and other transactions, which was the consequence of the 
social and economic environment that banks had to operate in.     23
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